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Abstract—Decision-making individuals are often likely to imi-
tate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimizing their
own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete in-
formation on how their utilities depend on their own and
others’ decisions. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have
been reported as the dominant asymptotic outcome of imitative
behaviors, yet little attempt has been made to characterize them,
particularly in heterogeneous populations. We study a finite well-
mixed heterogeneous population of individuals choosing between
the two strategies, cooperation and defection, and earning based
on their payoff matrices that can be unique to each individual.
At each time step, an arbitrary individual becomes active to
update her decision by imitating the highest earner in the
population. We show that almost surely the dynamics reach
either an equilibrium state or a minimal positively invariant
set, a fluctuation set, in the long run. In addition to finding all
equilibria, for the first time, we characterize the fluctuation sets,
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence,
and approximate their basins of attraction. In particular, given
the distribution of the individuals over the payoff matrices,
we explicitly identify all possible asymptotic outcomes for the
total number of cooperators in the population. We also find
that exclusive populations of individuals playing coordination
or prisoner’s dilemma games always equilibrate, implying that
cycles and non-convergence in imitative populations are due to
individuals playing anticoordination games. Moreover, we show
that except for the two extreme equilibrium states where all
individuals play the same strategy, almost all other equilibria
are unstable as long as the population is heterogeneous. Our
results theoretically explain earlier reported simulation results,
shed new lights on the boundedly rational nature of imitation
behaviors, and pave the way for future research on controlling
such populations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imitation is a commonly adopted decision-making strategy,
especially under bounded rationality [2]–[4]. Animals learn
skills [5] and find valuable food [6], managers make profitable
investments [7], firms avoid falling behind their rivals [8],
[9], and humans vaccinate against infectious diseases [10]–
[12]–all by mimicking successful others. Many seemingly
irrelevant processes such as death-birth can also be modeled
by imitation: a dead cell can be thought of as adapting to
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the cell that divides to occupy the vacancy left by the dead
[2]. In the context of evolutionary game theory, the recently
appealing field that applies game theory to the study and
control of spreading behaviors in evolving populations [13]–
[16], imitation is often modeled by the imitation update rule,
leading to the imitation dynamics [17]–[19] and its mean
field approximation, the famous replicator dynamics [20]–[22].
Compared to myopic best-response [23], where individuals
choose the action maximizing their current utility, imitation
more often leads to selfish behavior in certain human experi-
ments [24]. This higher selfishness, however, does not lead
to higher satisfaction. Although some continuous imitation
dynamics equilibrate in unstructured populations [25], fewer
networks of imitators are guaranteed to reach an equilibrium
state, where all individuals are satisfied with their actions
[26], [27]. Therefore, unlike best-responders, non-equilibration
and long-term oscillations are more observed among imitators
[28]–[30], possibly due to their limited rationality [31]. Al-
though representing dissatisfaction in social groups and stock
markets, the oscillations may also indicate life in organisms or
mobility in research organizations, emphasizing their key role
in different fields. The formulation of and conditions for these
oscillations, however, remains an open yet important problem.
Two of the most commonly adopted imitation rules are
unconditional imitation and replicator [21], [32]. Under un-
conditional imitation, an individual observes her neighbors’
(and in some settings, her own) payoffs and imitates the
one with the highest payoff. Under replicator, an individual
randomly selects a neighbor and decides to imitate her with the
probability proportional to the payoff difference if the neighbor
has a higher payoff [33]. Numerical simulations have shown
that in certain structured population, the long-term behavior
of the two can be greatly different [34]. We focus on the
unconditional imitation rule due to its extreme boundedly
rational nature and broad application [32], [35] and consider
the widely applied binary choices of strategies cooperation
and defection [15], [17], [26]. Most existing results on the
(unconditional) imitation rule are empirical. While cooperation
is reported to hardly sustain under imitation, simulation results
show that it can be promoted by the introduction of moderate
random exploration [18], [36], [37], increase of heterogeneity
[38], or combination with some other dynamics [39]. Further-
more, researchers have shown that chaotically changing spatial
patterns can be generated in structured populations [36], [40]
and the long-run behaviors vary by initial states with different
fractions of cooperative agents [34], [41]. It remains concealed
whether the chaotic fluctuations can also happen in well-mixed
populations, and if so, under what conditions. The importance
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2of well-mixed populations is upheld by real-world cases such
as stock markets and academic institutes, where individuals
observe the highest earners’ actions and payoffs. On the other
hand, many theoretical studies related to this topic focus on ho-
mogeneous populations [42]–[44]. Different approaches have
been used to show that cooperation can never emerge under
imitation dynamics in a well-mixed homogeneous population
where each individual performs a continuously mixed strategy
[17], and convergence analysis has been performed for net-
works of coordinating agents [45] and well-mixed populations
of agents playing public goods games [30]. Less attention has
been paid to heterogeneous populations, where agents earn
differently, even though slight changes of the agents’ payoffs
can remarkably promote cooperation in imitation dynamics
[46]. This is despite the literature pointing out the limitation of
structured homogeneous populations in understanding human
behavior, and more attention is demanded on heterogeneous
populations [47].
We consider a finite, well-mixed, heterogeneous population
of interacting agents playing against each other, choosing
cooperation or defection, and earning according to their
possibly unique payoff matrices. The agents become active
asynchronously to update their strategies according to the
(unconditional) imitation update rule. We take the distribution
of cooperators over the payoff matrices as the state of the
system and investigate its long-term behavior. The solution
trajectory either enters a non-singleton minimal positively
invariant set or reaches an equilibrium. By developing a
graphical representation of the dynamics, for the first time, we
characterize all these positively invariant sets for a given initial
condition and approximate their basins of attraction. Moreover,
we determine the equilibria of the dynamics and show that–
except for the two extreme equilibria where all agents play
the same strategy–they are all unstable as long as the popu-
lation is heterogeneous. In addition to these general results,
we investigate the special cases where the payoff matrices,
although different, are all of the form of one of the well-known
2× 2 games. In line with previous simulation results, we find
the dynamics equilibrate when the agents all play prisoner’s
dilemma or coordination games, but may fluctuate when some
play anticoordination games (such as snowdrift), highlighting
the key role of individuals with anticoordination payoff ma-
trices in forming oscillations. Our contribution is fourfold: i)
We show that heterogeneity is enough to cause oscillations
even in a well-mixed population. Reported fluctuations are,
thus, not necessarily due to how agents are connected. ii)
We explicitly characterize the oscillations and discover that
they are caused by the existence of individuals who highly
value the action opposite to the one taken by the majority,
and hence, agents with a base game of anticoordination are
the key components. iii) Results on stability shed new lights
on the bounded rational nature of imitation behaviors, pleading
ideas on controlling such populations for future studies, such
as changing the number of certain individuals, forcing a single
agent to change her strategy to break an undesired equilibrium
state. iv) The graphical representation method has the potential
to be applied to other population dynamics to provide intuitive
insight on the asymptotic behavior.
II. DECISION-MAKING UNDER IMITATION UPDATES
We consider a well-mixed population of n agents, labeled by
1, . . . , n, that are participating in a population game evolving
over time t = 0, 1 . . .. Each agent can choose between one of
two strategies, cooperation (C) and defection (D). At each
time step t, every agent earns an accumulated payoff against
the population, and one random agent becomes active to mimic
the strategy of the most successful agent in the population.
The four possible payoffs of an agent i = 1, . . . , n, against
her opponent are summarized by the 2× 2 payoff matrix
pii =
( C D
C Ri Si
D Ti Pi
)
, Si, Ri, Ti, Pi ∈ IR
whose lkth entry, l, k ∈ {C,D}, corresponds to the strategy
pair l-against-k. Let si denote the strategy of agent i in the
vector form, which is either sC ∆=
[
1 0
]>
for cooperation or
sD
∆
=
[
0 1
]>
for defection. Then the accumulated payoff or
the utility of agent i at time t against the population is
u¯i(t) = si(t)
>pii
[
nC(t) n− nC(t)]> ,
where nC(t) denotes the number of cooperators in the whole
population at time t. The imitation update rule for agent i
active at time t dictates that she revises her strategy at time t+1
to that of the agent with the maximum utility in the population
at time t. In case, two agents with different strategies, i.e., a
cooperator and a defector, both earn the highest utility, agent
i sticks to her current strategy. Equivalently, agent i switches
her strategy if and only if her strategy is not played by a
highest-earning agent:
si(t+ 1) =
{
si(t) si(t) ∈M(t)
1− si(t) si(t) 6∈ M(t)
, (1)
where 1 =
[
1 1
]>
and M(t) is the set of the strategies of
agents with maximum utility at time t, i.e.,
M(t) ∆=
{
sj(t)
∣∣∣ j ∈ arg max
k∈{1,...,n}
u¯k(t)
}
.
The agents can be thought of as firms competing over the
markets of a product. They produce the product either with
(C) or without (D) some features. Payoffs are then their
seasonal shares of the market. In each season, a firm may
imitate the one with the largest share of the market in the
last season to add/delete features to/from its own product. In a
different scenario, people involved in a pyramid scheme can be
regarded as agents who decide either to continue participating
in the scheme (C) or withdraw (D). Occasionally, they may
revise their decisions by blindly following the highest earning
individual. As another example, some graduate students or
scholars often decide to work on the scientific area that their
successful top-ranked fellows are working on, despite the
fact that their capabilities may be different. The model can
also be applied to scenarios where agents do not actually
“imitate”, but their behavior can be interpreted as imitation.
For example, cells in a cancerous organ can be either normal
(C) or cancer cells (D). All cells share the same glucose in the
3extracellular fluid; thus the whole population is well-mixed,
and the utility for each agent is its “reproduction capability”,
which is determined by its cost of glucose in division and the
amount of glucose it receives. When a cell dies, the vacant
left by is filled by the offspring of a neighbor, either a normal
cell or a cancer cell, which can be viewed as the dead cell
adapting to the neighbor cell with the highest utility.
We categorize all agents with the same payoff matrix into
the same type and assume that there are altogether m, 0 <
m ≤ n, types of agents. We label the types by 1, . . . ,m
according to the descending order of the number of agents
in the same type. The heterogeneity of the population is then
characterized by
p
∆
= (n1, n2, . . . , nm),
where ni is number of type-i agents and ni ≥ nj if i > j.
We take the distribution of cooperators over the types as the
state of the system:
x(t)
∆
= (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xm(t)) ,
where xj ∈ Z≥0 is the number of cooperators of type j. The
state space will then be
X ∆=
{
x ∈ Zm≥0
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
xi = n, xj ≤ nj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
}
.
We denote the total number of cooperators at a state x by
nC(x) and often simplify the notation nC(x(t)) to nC(t) for a
given time t. Update rule 1 together with the agents’ activation
mechanism govern the dynamics of x(t), which we refer to
as the (asynchronous) imitation dynamics. We assume that at
each time, every agent has the chance to update; however, only
one becomes active, making the dynamics asynchronous. For
example, it might be the case that every agent has a Poisson
clock–not synced with others–that upon ticking, she becomes
active to update her strategy. Then each time t will be when an
agent’s clock ticks. We refer to the order of the active agents
over time as the activation sequence, which is generated from
a random process. The randomness of the activation sequence,
implies that any finite sequence of agents shows up in the
activation sequence almost surely, i.e., with probability 1 as
time goes to infinity. Our goal is to study the evolution of x(t)
and nC(t) under the imitation dynamics, particularly, their
asymptotic behaviors.
III. EXAMPLE
To better understand the dynamics, we provide the following
example, where both equilibration and perpetual cycling can
happen for the same initial condition. Consider a population
comprising four types of agents with the type distribution
vector p = (13, 18, 5, 64) and payoff matrices
pi1 =
(
-0.3015 0.3685
1.2 -0.3
)
, pi2 =
(
1.68 -5.12
0.7 -1.3
)
,
pi3 =
(
0.1 0.5
1.0976 0.1216
)
, pi4 =
(
-0.29365 0.95635
1.185625 -1.309375
)
,
where pii, i = 1, . . . , 4, denotes the payoff matrix of type-i
agents. Note that pi1, pi2, and pi3 are payoff matrices of snow-
drift games and pi4 is a payoff matrix of a coordination game.
Under the imitation update rule (1), starting from the same
initial condition x(0) = (13, 18, 4, 0) with nC(x(0)) = 35,
based on the activation sequence, the solution trajectory x(t)
may either reach an equilibrium state or end up fluctuating
between several states with the total number of cooperators
(nC) in the interval (37, 63) (Fig. 1). We will return to this
example in Section VIII.
IV. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF IMITATION
DYNAMICS
We provide a graphical representation of how the agents’
strategies evolve over time, which turns out to be the key in
characterizing the oscillations and illustrating the convergence
results. The utility of every type-i agent who chooses to
cooperate at time t, denoted by uCi (t), and the utility of every
type-i agent who chooses to defect at time t, denoted by uDi (t),
are calculated as
uCi (t) = (Ri − Si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai
nC(t) + Sin︸︷︷︸
bi
,
uDi (t) = (Ti − Pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ci
nC(t) + Pin︸︷︷︸
di
.
Since ai, bi, ci and di are constants, the utility of type-i agents
is linear in nC . So as time evolves, uCi (t) and u
D
i (t) move
along the following two lines in the plane spanned by the two
axes nC (the x-axis) and utility, denoted by u, (the y-axis):
uCi
(
nC
)
= ain
C + bi, u
D
i
(
nC
)
= cin
C + di. (2)
We call uCi and u
D
i the cooperative and defective lines of
type-i agents. Given a state x ∈ X , if xi > 0, we say
that the uCi line is active (by x) since at least one type-i
agent is cooperating; otherwise, the uCi line is inactive (by
x). Similarly, if xi < ni, we say that the uDi line is active
(by x) since at least one type-i agent is defecting; otherwise,
the uDi line is inactive (by x). Therefore, in total there are 2m
lines in the plane, at least m of which are active at each time.
We call the line(s) with the maximum u value at nC , the max
line(s) at nC 1. Among the lines active by x ∈ X , we often
refer to the max at nC as the max active-by-x line at nC or
simply max active line at nC if it is clear from the context. If
the active agent switches her strategy to cooperation at t+ 1,
then nC(t + 1) = nC(t) + 1. If the active agent switches to
defection, then nC(t+1) = nC(t)−1. Otherwise, we will have
nC(t+ 1) = nC(t) and the same active-line configuration for
t+ 1 as that at time t. Hence, in order to find nC(t+ 1) from
nC(t), we need to move one unit right on the nC-axis if the
max active lines at nC(t) are all cooperative, and to left if the
max active lines at nC(t) are all defective, and do not move
otherwise (Fig. 2). In this way, we can monitor the evolution
over time of nC(t), but only partly that of x(t) since different
values of x may correspond to the same value of nC .
1There may be more than one max line at nC ; however, for sake of
simplicity, we often say the max line at nC is cooperative (defective) instead
of all the max lines at nC are cooperative (defective).
4(a) (b)
Fig. 1: The evolution of nC(x) in Section III under four different activation sequences. a) Trajectories x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), x4(t) all have the same
initial condition x(0) = (13, 18, 4, 0) with nC(0) = 35. However, under different activation sequences, x4(t) reaches an equilibrium at t = 59 and stays
there afterwards, while x1(t) and x2(t) keep fluctuating between those states with corresponding nC values between nC = 37 and nC = 63, and x3(t)
keeps fluctuating between those states with corresponding nC values between 37 and 38. b) The evolution of trajectory x3(t) over 100, 000 time steps. The
trajectory keeps fluctuating between those states with corresponding nC values between nC = 37 and nC = 63. However, it fluctuates between 37 and 38
most of the time.
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Fig. 2: Graphical representation of the imitation dynamics. Cooperative
and defective lines are represented by solid and dashed lines, respectively. Line
uCk is the max line at every n
C . Assume that at some time T , nC(T ) = 35,
uCk is inactive, and u
D
i is active. If the active agent at time T is a cooperator,
then she will change her strategy to defection, and we need to move one
unit left on the nC -axis to obtain nC(T + 1) = 34. Assume, instead, that
nC(T ) = 62, uCk is inactive, and u
C
j is active. Now if the active agent at
time T is a defector, then she will switch to cooperation, and we need to
move one unit right on the nC -axis to obtain nC(T + 1) = 63.
V. EQUILIBRIUM STATES
A state x∗ is an equilibrium of the imitation dynamics if
whenever the state x(t) equals x∗ it remains there afterwards,
regardless of the activation sequence. This means that no agent
would switch her strategy, which in view of the imitation
update rule, implies that every agent in the population has
chosen a strategy that is played by one with the highest payoff.
This condition is clearly satisfied if all agents are cooperating
or all agents are defecting. Indeed, there will be no other agent
with a different strategy to mimic in this case. This results
in the two equilibria x = (0, . . . , 0) and x = (n1, . . . , nm)
which we refer to as the extreme equilibrium states. The other
possibility for a state to be an equilibrium is the existence of
at least one cooperator and one defector who both have the
highest payoff in the population. Namely, they earn the same
payoff, and no other agent earns more. Let X ∗ ⊆ X denote
the set of all equilibrium states.
Theorem 1: Given a state x ∈ X , it holds that x ∈ X ∗ if
and only if exactly one of the following is true:
1) x = (0, . . . , 0) or x = (n1, . . . , nm);
2) there exist two (not necessarily different) agent types i
and j, such that xi 6= 0 and xj 6= nj , (ai − cj)nC(x) =
dj − bi, and for every other type k, it holds that{
xk = 0 if aknC(x) + bk > ainC(x) + bi,
xk = nk if cknC(x) + dk > cjnC(x) + dj .
Theorem 1 enables us to systematically loop over all states
to find the equilibria: for each nC ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we check
the conditions in Theorem 1 for all states x ∈ X whose
number of cooperators equals nC . When checking for possible
ks in the theorem, one may use the following property that is
straightforward to show. For each type-k agent, we have{
xk 6= nk if nk > nC(x),
xk 6= 0 if nk > n− nC(x).
(3)
Back to the graphical representation, the corresponding
representation of x∗ ∈ X ∗ must be a point such that nC neither
moves right nor left from nC(x∗) over time. In addition to the
two trivial cases of nC = 0 and nC = n, this happens only
when a cooperative and a defective max active line at nC(x∗)
intersect.
Proposition 1: x∗ ∈ X ∗ if and only if exactly one of the
following is true:
520 37.5 80
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Fig. 3: Intersection points. Points a, b, and e are intersection points, but
points c and d are not. Among these intersection points, equilibria can be
reached only at nC(e) since b is non-integer and a cannot be intersected by
max active lines as both uCj and u
D
j are above a at n
C(a) and at least one
of them is active at any time. Any equilibrium with intersection point e is
potentially attracting since uCj (79) > u
D
i (79).
1) nC(x∗) = 0 or nC(x∗) = n;
2) there exist a cooperative max and a defective max line at
nC(x∗), both active by x∗, which intersect at nC(x∗).
Given two (not necessarily different) agent types i and j, if
the cooperative and defective lines uCi and u
D
j intersect at a
point with the nC value in the interval [1, n−1], we denote the
intersection point by pij and its corresponding nC value by
nC(pij). We refer to the intersection point of an equilibrium
state x∗, mentioned in Proposition 1, as the intersection point
of x∗. If nC(pij) is an integer, pij is called an integer inter-
section point, otherwise, a non-integer intersection point. The
intersection point of an equilibrium state must have an integer
nC-value; moreover, according to Proposition 1, it has to be
intersected by two lines that are max active at the nC value
of the state (Fig. 3). Intersection points can be classified into
two types according to how the cooperative and defective lines
intersect. An intersection point pij is said to be potentially
attracting if uCi (n
C(pij)− 1) > uDj (nC(pij)− 1) since other
states with nC values near nC(pij) may be “attracted to”
this type of equilibrium state; otherwise, it is said to be non-
attracting since no state with an nC value nearby will converge
to this point.
VI. FLUCTUATION SETS
As discussed in Section III and also based on the simulation
results in [41], the solution trajectory often does not reach
an equilibrium but perpetually fluctuates. Then we expect the
trajectory to eventually enter a set of states and never leave. We
define a set Q to be positively invariant if for any x(0) ∈ Q
and under any activation sequence, x(t) ∈ Q for all t ≥ 0. A
positively invariant set is called minimal if it does not contain
any subset that is positively invariant. Although seemingly
trivial, for rigorousness, the following result is proved in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1: Given any x(0) ∈ X and under any random
activation sequence, there exists a minimal positively invariant
set O ⊆ X such that almost surely x(T ) ∈ O for some T ≥ 0.
We note that all convergence results in this paper hold
almost surely, and for simplicity, we avoid this term from the
statement of the results. In view of Lemma 1, x(t) reaches
either an equilibrium or a non-singleton minimal positively
invariant set that contains no equilibrium. So we have the
following result.
Proposition 2: x(t) never reaches an equilibrium if and only
if there exists a non-singleton minimal positively invariant set
O ⊆ X , such that x(T ) ∈ O for some T ≥ 0.
Being in a non-singleton minimal positively invariant set,
x(t) will fluctuate among the states of this set and visit each
one infinitely often. The following result readily follows from
the randomness of the activation sequence.
Lemma 2: Let O ⊆ X be a non-singleton minimal positively
invariant set. If x(0) ∈ O, then for each y ∈ O, there are
infinitely many time instants t ∈ Z≥0, at which x(t) = y.
Therefore, we refer to the non-singleton minimal positively
invariant sets as fluctuation sets.
Back to the graphical representation, the existence of
a fluctuation set O implies the existence of an interval
I = [minx∈O nC(x),maxx∈O nC(x)], which we call a fluc-
tuation interval, such that if x(0) ∈ O, then we have
nC(x(t)) ∈ I ∀t ≥ 0. Clearly, minx∈O nC(x) ≥ 1 and
maxx∈O nC(x) ≤ n−1 as the states with nC(x) = 0 or n are
equilibria. Hence, a fluctuation interval I is a sub-interval of
[1, n−1]. As we later show in Section VIII, the interval [27, 63]
in Fig. 1 is, indeed, a fluctuation interval. For trajectories
that enter the corresponding fluctuation set, the number of
cooperators never falls short of 27 or exceeds 63 afterwards,
which implies that the max active line is cooperative every
time there are 27 cooperators and defective every time there
are 63 cooperators. This observation can be generally stated
as follows.
Lemma 3: If I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, is a fluctuation
interval with corresponding fluctuation set Ø, then for any
x ∈ O with nC(x) = a (resp. b), among the lines active by x,
the max at a (resp. b), is a cooperative (resp. defective) line.
Lemma 3 states that for all x ∈ Ø with nC(x) = a (resp.
b), the max active-by-x line is cooperative (resp. defective).
However, can the max line at a be defective but never active by
any x ∈ Ø? The following result provides a negative answer.
Proposition 3: If I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, is
a fluctuation interval, then the max line at a (resp. b) is a
cooperative (resp. defective) line.
The graphical representation of the imitation dynamics for
Fig. 1, is shown in Fig. 6. As seen, the max lines at nC = 27
and 63 are uC4 and u
D
3 , which are cooperative and defective,
respectively.
Interestingly, when nC is in any of the intervals [27, 28]
and [62, 63], it fluctuates back and forth several times and
then moves towards the center of the fluctuation interval. This,
intuitively, implies the existence of two intersection points
with nC-values in the interval [27, 28] and [62, 63] that cause
the fluctuation. Such an intersection point, say pij , has the
property that for some time t when nC(t) = bnC(pij)c and a
defector is active, uCi is the maximum among all active lines
at bnC(pij)c, resulting in nC(t+ 1) = dnC(pij)e, where bxc
(resp. dxe) is the greatest (resp. smallest) integer less than
615.1 51.838.8 66
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Fig. 4: Fluctuation point. The point pii is a fluctuation point since it is a
non-integer potentially attracting intersection point, there exists some state
y ∈ X such that among the lines active by y, uCi is max at nC(y) =bnC(pii)c = 51, and there exists some state z ∈ X such that among the
lines active by z, uDi is max at n
C(z) = dnC(pij)e = 52. The point pji
is a fluctuation point if uCi can be inactive when n
C(t) = bnC(pji)c and
when nC(t+1) = dnC(pji)e. The point pjj can never be a fluctuation point
since the max active line can never be uCj and u
D
j at n
C = bnC(pjj)c =
38 and nC = dnC(pjj)e = 39, respectively. An example of a fluctuation
around nC(pii) is described as follows: if at some time t we have nC(t) =
bnC(pii)c = 51, both uCi and uDi are active, and the active agent is a
defector, then she will switch to cooperation and by moving one unit right on
the nC -axis, we obtain nC(t+1) = dnC(pii)e = 52. If the active agent at
t+1 is a cooperator, then by moving one unit left on the nC -axis, we obtain
nC(t + 2) = bnC(pii)c = 51. The fluctuation continues until one of uCi
and uDi becomes inactive.
(resp. greater than) or equal to real number x. So the intersec-
tion point is potentially attracting. Moreover, at t+1 a defector
is active and uDj is the maximum among all active lines at
dnC(pij)e, resulting in nC(t + 2) = nC(t) = bnC(pij)c.
This repetitive behavior of nC can last until either uCi or u
D
j
become inactive or they no longer excel the active lines. This
motivates us to make the following definition. Given a state
x ∈ X , let X+1(x) denote the set of states whose entries are
all the same as those of x, except for a single entry that is one
more:
X+1(x) =
{
z ∈ X | ∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} :
(zi = xi∀i 6= k, zk = xk + 1)
}
.
We call a non-integer potentially attracting intersection point
pij of type-i and type-j agents a fluctuation point, if there
exist both a state x ∈ X with nC(x) = bnC(pij)c such that
among the lines active by x, uCi is max at bnC(pij)c, and a
state y ∈ X+1(x) with nC(y) = dnC(pij)e such that among
the lines active by y, uDj is max at dnC(pij)e (Fig. 4). We say
an interval ‘contains’ an intersection point if the nC-value of
that intersection point belongs to the interval.
Lemma 4: If I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, is a fluctuation
interval, then each of the intervals (a, a + 1) and (b − 1, b)
contains a fluctuation point.
Back to the example, the non-integer potentially attracting
intersection points p33 and p34 are fluctuation points with
nC(p33) ∈ (27, 28) and nC(p34) ∈ (62, 63) (Fig. 6).
We know that the nC-value of a trajectory starting from
the fluctuation set can never “pass” the end points of the
fluctuation interval. Namely, given a fluctuation set Ø with
the fluctuation interval I = [a, b], if x(0) ∈ Ø, then
nC(x(t)) ∈ [a, b] ∀t ≥ 0. Apparently, the two end intervals
[a, a+ 1] and [b− 1, b] perform as a “wall” that do not allow
the nC-value of any solution trajectory to pass them from
right and left, respectively. Formally, we define an interval
[a, a+1], a ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, that contains a fluctuation point to
be a left wall if for any trajectory x(t) with nC(x(0)) ≥ a+1,
we have nC(x(t)) ≥ a ∀t ≥ 0 under any activation sequence.
Similarly, we define a right wall. Now we reveal the necessary
and sufficient condition for an interval to be a wall in terms
of the graphical representation. For the interval [a, a + 1],
denote the max defective lines at a and a + 1 by uDr and
uDs , respectively. Then let R ⊆ {1, . . . , n} denote the set of
agents whose cooperative lines are below the defective line uDr
at a, and let S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents whose
cooperative lines are above the defective line uDs at a + 1
(Fig. 5).
Lemma 5: An interval [a, a + 1], a ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2},
containing a fluctuation point is a left wall if and only if
|R \ S| < a.
A similar result to that of Lemma 5 can be stated for a
right wall. For the interval [b − 1, b], b ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1},
denote the max cooperative lines at b − 1 and b by uCl and
uCk , respectively. Then let L ⊆ {1, . . . , n} denote the set of
agents whose defective lines are above the cooperative line
uCl at b− 1, and let K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents
whose defective lines are below the cooperative line uCk at b.
Lemma 6: An interval [b − 1, b], b ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1},
containing a fluctuation point is a right wall if and only if
|K \ L| < n− b.
Using Lemma 5 and 6, we prove the following theorem
states that each fluctuation interval consists of a left and right
wall.
Theorem 2: If I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, is a
fluctuation interval, then [a, a+ 1] is a left wall and [b− 1, b]
is a right wall.
According to Theorem 2, the total number of cooperators
is confined to a fluctuation interval I = [a, b] not only for
initial states within the corresponding fluctuation set, i.e.,
x(0) ∈ Ø, but also for any other initial state with the
number of cooperators in the open fluctuation interval, i.e.,
x(0) 6∈ Ø, nC(x(0)) ∈ [a+ 1, b− 1].
Corollary 1: If I = [a, b], where a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, is
a fluctuation interval, then for any initial condition x(0) with
nC(x(0)) ∈ [a+ 1, b− 1], we have nC(x(t)) ∈ I ∀t > 0.
This result also puts forward the set
Q = {x ∈ X |nC(x) ∈ [a+ 1, b− 1]} (4)
as a subset of the basin of attraction of the union of all
fluctuation sets with the corresponding fluctuation interval
I = [a, b]. Moreover, we now have a sufficient condition
for the solution trajectory to reach an equilibrium, thanks to
Proposition 2.
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Fig. 5: A left wall. The interval [40, 41] is a left wall containing two
fluctuation points labelled by 1 and 2. The type distribution vector p of this
population is (30, 30, 20, 20). The max defective line is uD1 at n
C = 40 and
uD2 at n
C = 41. The set of agents whose types have cooperative lines below
uD1 at n
C = 40 is R = {61, . . . , 100}, which consists of type-3 and type-4
agents and the set of agents whose types have cooperative lines above uD2 at
nC = 41 is S = {61, . . . , 80}, which only consists of type-3 agents. Hence,
|R \ S| < 40, which in view of Lemma 5, implies that for any trajectory
x(t) with nC(0) ≥ 41, we have nC(x(t)) ≥ 40 ∀t ≥ 0.
Corollary 2: x(t) reaches an equilibrium if there is no
interval I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} such that [a, a+ 1] is
a left and [b− 1, b] is a right wall.
However, having both a left and a right wall does not
guarantee the existence of a fluctuation interval, and hence, set.
First of all, there may by another left or right wall within the
interval defined by the two walls, making the corresponding
set not minimal. Secondly, even if the interval defined by the
two walls does not include any other wall, it may contain an
equilibrium point, which may, again, make the corresponding
set not minimal. By ignoring the second case, we can provide
the following result.
Proposition 4: An interval I = [a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
is a fluctuation interval if it is the minimal interval with the
properties that [a, a+1] is a left wall, [b−1, b] is a right wall,
and for all equilibrium states x∗ ∈ X ∗, we have nC(x∗) /∈ I.
By using Lemmas 5 and 6, we acquire the following
sufficient condition on the graphical representation for having
a fluctuation interval.
Theorem 3: An interval I ⊆ [1, n−1] is a fluctuation interval
if there are two fluctuation points pij and plk of agent types
i, j, l, and k, such that the followings are true:
1) I = [bnC(pij)c, dnC(plk)e];
2) for interval [bnC(pij)c, bnC(pij)c+1], we have |R\S| <
bnC(pij)c, and for interval [dnC(plk)e − 1, dnC(plk)e],
we have |K \ L| < n− dnC(plk)e.
3) no subinterval of I satisfies the above conditions;
4) for all equilibrium states x∗, we have nC(x∗) /∈ I.
The above conditions ensure that an interval I is a fluc-
tuation interval, and hence, corresponding to which, there is
at least one fluctuation set Ø. Although the theorem does not
explicitly determine the form of Ø, it specifies the possible
range of its number of cooperators, i.e., I.
VII. STABILITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the stability of the population dynamics under
the imitation update rule (1). Let ‖ · ‖ denote the one-norm,
i.e., ‖x‖ = ∑i=1 |xi|. An equilibrium state s ∈ X ∗ is
(Lyapunov) stable if for every open ball (in the state space)
B(s) = {x ∈ X | ‖x − s‖ < }, there exists a ball Bδ(s)
such that for every x(0) ∈ Bδ , we have x(t) ∈ B ∀t ≥ 0
under any activation sequence. Due to the discrete nature
of the state space X , we require  and δ to be at least 2.
Otherwise, if we take δ = 1, we have Bδ(s) = {s}, resulting
in x(t) = s ∀t ≥ 0, even if s is unstable. Also, if we take
 = 1, we have B(s) = {s}, requiring x(t) = s ∀t ≥ 0
for s to be stable–an impossible condition. An equilibrium
state s ∈ X ∗ is asymptotically stable if it is stable and there
exists some ball Bδ(s) such that limt→∞||x(t) − s|| = 0 for
all x(0) ∈ Bδ(s) and under any random activation sequence.
First, we study populations with only one type of agents,
i.e., m = 1.
Proposition 5: In a population with only one type of agents,
an equilibrium state s = (x1), x1 ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, is stable
if and only if uC1 (x1 − 1) ≥ uD1 (x1 − 1) and uC1 (x1 + 1) ≤
uD1 (x1 + 1), and is asymptotically stable if and only if the
inequalities are strict, i.e., uC1 (x1 − 1) > uD1 (x1 − 1) and
uC1 (x1 + 1) < u
D
1 (x1 + 1).
Now we proceed to populations with at least two types. We
start with the extreme equilibria and then proceed to other
equilibria.
Proposition 6: In a population with at least two types of
agents, the equilibrium state (0, . . . , 0) (resp. (n1, . . . , nm))
is unstable if and only if there exists an agent type i such that
if ni > 1 (resp. ni < n), then
uCi (1) > u
D
j (1) (resp. u
D
i (n− 1) > uCj (n− 1)) ∀j,
and if ni = 1 (resp. ni = n), then
uCi (1) > u
D
j (1) (resp. u
D
i (n− 1) > uCj (n− 1)) ∀j 6= i.
If we exclude populations having a type with just one agent,
we obtain the following result
Theorem 4: In a population with at least two types of agents,
and where every type has at least two agents, the extreme
equilibrium state (0, . . . , 0) (resp. (n1, . . . , nm)) is stable if
and only if among the max lines at 1 (resp. n−1), at least one
is defective (resp. cooperative), and is asymptotically stable if
and only if the max line at 1 (resp. n− 1) is defective (resp.
cooperative).
Theorem 5: In a population with at least two types of agents,
a non-extreme equilibrium state x∗ is stable if and only if every
state y ∈ {x ∈ X | ||x∗−x|| = 1} is an equilibrium. Moreover,
non-extreme equilibria are not asymptotically stable.
According to the theorem, the only possibility for a non-
extreme equilibrium to be stable is to be fully surrounded by
other equilibria. Namely, if an equilibrium x∗ with nC(x∗) =
a is stable, then all of the states at nC = a−1 and nC = a+1
must also be equilibria. In view of the graphical representation,
a population is unlikely to possess such a feature.
81
5
2
7
.5
3
7
.5
6
2
.5
6
9
.4
7
5
7
9
.6
8
8
.5
9
0
1
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
9
0
.9
p11
p13
p33
p43
p41
p31
p23
p34
p44
p14 p42
p22
p32
p24
p21
nC
u
uC1
uD1
uC2
uD2
uC3
uD3
uC4
uD4
Fig. 6: The graphical representation of a well-mixed population of 100 agents, in which there are 4 agent types. The type distribution is (13, 18, 5, 64). The
integer intersection points are p13, p32, p23, and the non-integer but potentially attracting intersection points are p33, p11, p43, p31, p41, p14, p44, p34, p42.
Among them, p13 and p23 are equilibrium points, and p33, p43, p31, p41, and p34 are fluctuation points. We have left walls [bnC(p33)c, dnC(p33)e] and
[bnC(p43)c, dnC(p43)e], and right wall [bnC(p34)c, dnC(p34)e]. However, due to minimality, the only fluctuation interval is [bnC(p43)c, dnC(p34)e] =
[37, 63], which is colored by light green.
VIII. REVISITING THE EXAMPLE
First, we find the cooperative and defective lines of each
type of agent:{
uC1 = −0.7nC + 36.9
uD1 = 1.5n
C − 30
{
uC2 = 6.8n
C − 512
uD2 = 2n
C − 130{
uC3 = −0.4nC + 50
uD3 = n
C + 12.2
{
uC4 = −1.3nC + 95.7
uD4 = 2.5n
C − 130.9 .
Next, we find the intersection points between all pairs of
cooperative and defective lines in order to determine the
equilibria and fluctuation sets. Among all intersection points,
we have integer intersection points p13, p32, p23, which are
candidates for equilibrium states, and non-integer but poten-
tially attracting intersection points p33, p11, p43, p31, p41, p14,
p44, p34, p42, which are candidates for fluctuation points.
For the equilibria, the states corresponding to p32 cannot
be an equilibrium according to (3) since nC(p32) = 75 and
n2 = 18 < 25 = n − 75 = nD, which implies that at least
one of the defective lines above p32 is active at nC = 75.
In view of Theorem 1, the equilibrium states corresponding
to p13 and p23 are (x1, x2, 0, 0) where x1, x2 ∈ N, x1 > 0,
x1 + x2 = 15, and (13, y2, y3, y4) where y2, y3, y4 ∈ N, y2 >
0, y3 < 5, y2 + y3 + y4 = 77. These states together with the
extreme equilibria (0, 0, 0, 0) and (13, 18, 5, 64) form all of
the equilibrium states of the dynamics. Namely, X ∗ equals{
(0, 0, 0, 0), (13, 18, 5, 64), (x1, x2, 0, 0), (13, y2, y3, y4)|
x1, x2, y2, y3, y4 ∈ N, x1 ≥ 1, x1 + x2 = 15,
y2 ≥ 1, y3 ≤ 4, y2 + y3 + y4 = 77
}
.
As with the fluctuation points, the intersection point p11
cannot be one as both of the cooperative and defective lines
uC3 and u
D
3 are above p11 at n
C(p11). The same holds for p14,
p44 and p42. So the only possible fluctuation points among
the candidates are p33, p43, p31, p41, and p34. By checking
the conditions in Lemmas 5 and 6, we find that intervals
[bp33c, dp33e] and [bp43c, dp43e] are left walls and interval
[bp34c, dp34e] is a right wall. So due to minimality, the only
fluctuation interval is [bp43c, dp34e] = [37, 63], which can be
also verified by Theorem 3. Therefore, there exist one (or
more) fluctuation set(s) Ø with minx∈O nC(x) = 37 and
maxx∈O nC(x) = 63.
Now, thanks to Corollary 1, a trajectory x(t) never con-
verges to an equilibrium if nC(x(T )) ∈ [38, 62] at some
time T . This explains the behavior of trajectories x1(t),
x2(t), x3(t) in Fig. 1. Since the nC-values of these four
trajectories enter the fluctuation interval, they never converge
to the equilibrium at nC = 15 like x4(t) does. Note that
the nC values of trajectories trapped in the fluctuation set(s)
seem to be constrained in the interval [37, 38] is because the
probability of leaving the fluctuation at this interval is fairly
small, although greater than zero. Similarly, the probability of
leaving the fluctuation at [45, 46] from the right end is much
smaller than leaving from the left end, so we rarely see nC
reaching 63, even though it does. More generally, we have the
following cases regarding nC(0):
Case 1: For 0 < nC(0) < 27, if x1(0)+x2(0) ≥ 1, then the
max active line is always a cooperative line at nC(0). Thus,
nC(x(t)) will increase until it enters the fluctuation interval
at some time T , resulting in x(t) ∈ O∀t ≥ T . If x1(0) =
x2(0) = 0, then depending on the activation sequence, x(t)
may either reach an equilibrium corresponding to p13 or enter
the fluctuation set.
Case 2: For 27 ≤ nC(0) ≤ 37, if x4(0) ≥ 1, then x(t) ∈
O∀t ≥ T for some time T ≥ 0. If x4(0) = 0, then the
nC(x(t)) fluctuates between 27 and 28 until a type-4 defector
switches to cooperation, making uC4 active, driving the solution
trajectory to the fluctuation set. Namely, again x(t) ∈ O∀t ≥
T for some time T ≥ 0.
9Case 3: For 38 ≤ nC(0) ≤ 62, x(t) ∈ O∀t ≥ 0.
Case 4: For 63 ≤ nC(0) ≤ 81, the max active line is always
a defective line at nC(0); otherwise, all agents of types 1, 3 and
4 must be cooperative, resulting in nC(0) ≥ n1 + n3 + n4 =
82 > 81. Therefore, for some time T , x(t) ∈ O ∀t ≥ T .
Case 5: For 82 ≤ nC(0) ≤ 89, if x1(0) ≤ 12 or x3(0) ≤ 4
or x4(0) ≤ 63, then the max active line is a defective line at
nC(0). Thus, x(t) ∈ O∀t ≥ T for some time T ; if x1(0) =
13, x3(0) = 5, and x4(0) = 64, then the cooperative line
uC2 is active, driving the solution trajectory to the extreme
equilibrium (13, 18, 5, 64).
Case 6: For nC(0) = 90, if x1(0) = 13, x3(0) ≤ 4, then
x(t) = x(0) ∈ X ∗ ∀t (note that x2(0) ≥ 1 since nC(0) ≥ 90).
If x1(0) < 13 the max active line is a defective line at nC(0),
resulting in x(t) ∈ O∀t ≥ T for some time T . If x1(0) = 13
but x3(0) = 5, then the solution trajectory reaches the extreme
equilibrium (13, 18, 5, 64).
Case 7: For 91 ≤ nC(0) < 100, since x2(0) ≥ 1, the solu-
tion trajectory reaches the extreme equilibrium (13, 18, 5, 64).
By combining Cases 2 to 4, we obtain the following subset
of the basin of attraction of the (union of the) fluctuation set(s)
Ø: {
x ∈ X | 27 ≤ nC(x) ≤ 81} .
IX. APPROXIMATING THE BASIN OF ATTRACTION
Motivated by the example, we establish the following propo-
sition to approximate the basin of attraction of the fluctuation
interval I = [a, b]. In view of Proposition 3, the max lines at
a and b are cooperative and defective, respectively, denoted by
uCi and u
D
k for some types i and k. If there is an intersection
point p1 on uCi such that there is no intersection point at any
nC ∈ (nC(p1), nC(pij)), then define a′ = nC(p1), otherwise,
a′ = 0. If there is an intersection point p2 on uDk such that
there is no intersection point at any nC ∈ (nC(plk), nC(p2)),
then define b′ = nC(p2), otherwise, b′ = n. Define Q =
Q1 ∪Q2, where
Q1 =
{
x ∈ X |nC(x) ∈ [a′, nC(pij)], xi ≥ 0
}
,
Q2 =
{
x ∈ X |nC(x) ∈ [nC(plk), b′], xk ≤ nk − 1
}
.
Proposition 7: If x(0) ∈ Q, then there exists some time
T ≥ 0 such that nC(t) ∈ I ∀t ≥ T .
So Q is a subset of the basin of attraction of the union of
the fluctuation sets with the corresponding fluctuation interval
I.
X. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS FOR WELL-KNOWN 2× 2
GAMES
After presenting the general results on the asymptotic be-
havior of imitation dynamics, we now apply them to the three
acknowledged 2× 2 games [27].
Coordination. The payoff matrix of an agent i is called a
coordination payoff matrix if
Ri > Ti, Pi > Si. (5)
The agent then earns more if she plays the same strategy as her
opponent’s. In other words, myopically, she profits by coordi-
nating with her opponent, hence, the name ‘coordination’. The
above constraint on the payoffs restrains the cooperative and
defective lines of the same type of agents to form a potentially
attracting intersection point.
Lemma 7: Consider an exclusive population of agents with
coordination payoff matrices. For any potentially attracting in-
tersection point pij of agent types i and j in the corresponding
graphical representation, it holds that i 6= j.
So, potentially attracting intersection points, and hence,
fluctuation points can occur only between lines of different
agent types. As a result, we show that it is impossible to have
both a left wall and a right wall in the population, forcing the
dynamics to equilibrate.
Proposition 8: Every exclusive population of agents with
coordination payoff matrices and governed by imitation dy-
namics will equilibrate.
We note that Lemma 7 and Proposition 8 still hold if (5)
is relaxed to Ri + Pi > Ti + Si. This allows for the payoff
matrices to be those of an opponent-coordinating game [27],
where Ri > Si and Pi > Ti.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The payoff matrix of an agent i is called
a prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix if
Ti > Ri, Pi > Si. (6)
This payoff constraint, results in the following strong restric-
tion on the graphical representation.
Lemma 8: Given an exclusive population of agents with pris-
oner’s dilemma payoff matrices, a defective line is above all
other lines (at every point nC) in the graphical representation.
Similarly, the following result can be shown.
Lemma 9: Consider an exclusive population of agents
with prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrices. For any potentially
attracting intersection points pij of agent types i and j in the
corresponding graphical representation, it holds that i 6= j.
So similar to the coordination case, Lemma 9 implies that
the dynamics converge to an equilibrium. However, thanks to
Lemma 8, we can provide a simpler proof here.
Proposition 9: Every exclusive population of agents with
prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrices and governed by imitation
dynamics will equilibrate.
Coordination and Prisoner’s Dilemma. Because of Lemmas
7 and 9, we can combine the results of the previous two
subsections as follows.
Theorem 6: Every exclusive population of agents with
either prisoner’s dilemma or coordination payoff matrices and
governed by imitation dynamics will equilibrate.
Anticoordination. The payoff matrix of an agent i is called a
anticoordination payoff matrix if
Ti > Ri, Si > Pi. (7)
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Fig. 7: All agents in both populations share the same anticoordination
payoff matrix, and hence, belong to the same type 1. a) p11 is an integer
intersection point. Unless the solution trajectory starts from either of the
extreme equilibria, it reaches the equilibrium x∗ = (nC(p11)). b) p11 is
a fluctuation point. Unless the solution trajectory starts from either of the
extreme equilibria, it ends up fluctuating between x1 = (50) and x2 = (51)
forever.
The agent then earns more if she plays the opposite strategy of
her opponent’s. In other words, myopically, she profits by anti-
coordinating with her opponent, hence, the name ‘anticoordi-
nation’. Note that games such as snowdrift and chicken game
have payoff matrices that also follows the above constraint.
Unlike with the coordination and prisoner’s dilemma cases, the
above constraint guarantees a potentially attractive intersection
point formed by the two lines of every agent type.
Lemma 10: Corresponding to every agent i with an antico-
ordination payoff matrix, there exists an potentially attracting
intersection point pii.
The existence of walls, therefore, may not be excluded.
Indeed, both possible asymptotic behaviors of the imitation
dynamics are covered by single-type populations of agents
with the same anticoordination payoff matrix (Fig. 7). Non-
convergence to equilibrium states in imitation dynamics is,
hence, due to the existence of agents with anti-coordination
payoff matrices as any population of agents with the other
two types of payoff matrices equilibrate.
XI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that finite well-mixed heterogeneous pop-
ulations of agents who asynchronously imitate the one with
the highest payoff may either reach an equilibrium or undergo
perpetual fluctuations in a minimal positively invariant set in
the long run. In addition to finding every equilibrium state
of the dynamics, for the first time, we have characterized
all of the positively invariant sets and approximated their
basin of attraction. Our results apply to social contexts where
individuals are likely to take the same action as the most
successful individual, for example, breaking social norms
among teenagers, blindly investing on what successful firms
are, and volunteering to establish a social service. For a
population of imitators that never settles on a state where
everyone is satisfied with her action, our analysis suggests
the existence of a group of individuals who have higher
payoffs when they cooperate if the cooperation level is low
and defect if the cooperation level is high. This together with
the characterization of the fluctuation intervals and equilibria,
pave the way for controlling the total number of cooperators in
the population as well as shaping the length of the oscillations.
APPENDIX
Lemma 11: A cooperative type-i agent and a defective type-
j agent (i and j are not necessarily different) have the same
payoff at nC ∈ [0, n] if and only if (ai − cj)nC = dj − bi.
Proof:
nC =
dj − bi
ai − cj
(2)⇐⇒ uCi (nC) = uDj (nC).
Proof of Theorem 1: (Sufficiency) In Case 1), since
for both states, agents are either all cooperating or defecting,
then according to (1), no agent can switch her strategy in
the next time step for all time. Therefore, we have x ∈ X ∗.
Now we show the proof for Case 2). First, note that since
(ai − cj)nC(x) = dj − bi, it follows from Lemma 11 in
the Appendix that there are a type-i cooperator and a type-j
defector having the same payoff at nC(x). Now we prove
by contradiction. Assume on the contrary, x /∈ X ∗. Then
by definition, there exists an agent of type k /∈ {i, j} such
that either uCk (n
C(x)) > uCi (n
C(x)) = uDj (n
C(x)) with
xk > 0 or uDk (n
C(x)) > uCi (n
C(x)) = uDj (n
C(x)) with
xk < nk. Both cases contradict the last condition in the
lemma. Therefore, we have x ∈ X ∗.
(Necessity) Consider an equilibrium state x ∈ X ∗. If
nC(x) = 0 or n, then x = (0, . . . , 0) or (n1, . . . , nm).
If nC(x) ∈ (0, n), then there are both cooperating and
defecting agents in the population. Since they never change
their strategies upon activation, according to (1) there must
exist a cooperating agent of say type-i and a defecting agent
of say type-j, both earning the highest payoffs. This implies
that xi 6= 0, xj 6= nj , and also (ai − cj)nC(x) = dj − bi
in view of Lemma 11. Moreover, since uCi and u
D
j are both
the greatest utilities at nC(x), if there is a type-k agent with
uCk (n
C) > uCi (n
C), i.e., aknC + bk > ainC + bi, then it must
be defecting, i.e., xk = 0, and if there is a type-k agent with
uDk (n
C) < uDi (n
C), i.e., cknC +dk > cinC +di, then it must
be cooperating, i.e., xk = nk. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove by showing that
Proposition 1 is a graphical interpretation of Theorem 1. Since
nC((0, . . . , 0)) = 0 and nC(n1, . . . , nm) = n, we know that
the first case in Theorem 1 is equivalent to the first case in
Proposition 1. On the other hand, from (2) and Lemma 11,
we know that the second case in Theorem 1 is equivalent
to the case where cooperating agents of type i and defecting
agents of type j are both having the highest payoff. This is
also equivalent to the second case of the Proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1: First, x(t) does belong to a positively
invariant set for all t ≥ 0 as x(t) ∈ X and X is positively
invariant. Moreover, by definition, X has one or more minimal
positively invariant subsets X1, . . . ,Xp, p ∈ Z≥0. By contra-
diction, we prove that x belongs to one of them for some
T > 0. Assume on the contrary that for all t > 0, x(t) is not
contained in any of them. Thus, for all t > 0, x(t) is confined
to the subset S ⊆ X − ∪pi=1Xi, which is nonempty. Being
finite, S has a nonempty subset S ′ of states, each of which
is visited by x infinitely many times. Now if there exists a
trajectory y(t) that starts from S ′ but leaves it at some time
t′ > t, then x(t) cannot intersect with y(t) since, otherwise,
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x(t) would also follow y(t) and leave S ′ at some time due
to the randomness of the activation sequence. Exclude the
states of all such outgoing trajectories y(t) from S ′ to obtain
the set S ′′. The set S ′′ is positively invariant since there are
no trajectories leaving it, and nonempty since x(t) ∈ S ′′ for
all t ≥ 0. Hence, S ′′ contains a minimal positively invariant
subset S ′′′ that itself is a minimal positively invariant subset
of X . However, S ′′′ does not equal any of Xis, which is a
contradiction, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: (Sufficiency) From Lemma 1
we know that there exists s a minimal positively invariant set
Ø such that x(T ) ∈ Ø for some T ≥ 0. Since x(t) never
reaches an equilibrium, we know that Ø does not contains
an equilibrium state, otherwise x(t) can reach it under some
activation sequence. Thus, the set Ø is a non-singleton minimal
positively invariant set such that x(T ) ∈ Ø for some T ≥ 0.
(Necessity) Since x(T ) ∈ Ø for some T ≥ 0, where Ø
is a non-singleton minimal positively invariant set. By the
definition of non-singleton minimal positively invariant sets,
we know that x(t) never reaches an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2: We prove this by contradiction.
Assume on the contrary that there exists a state y ∈ Ø such
that there are only finite many time instants {t1, . . . , ts} at
which x(ti) = y, i ∈ {t1, . . . , ts}. By definition, this implies
that the set Ø \ y is a positively invariant set. This contradicts
the fact that Ø is minimal.
Proof of Lemma 3: We only show the result for all x ∈ O
with nC(x) = a. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the
contrary that there exists a state x′ ∈ O with nC(x′) = a such
that among the lines active by x′, the max at a is a defective
line. Consider some x(0) ∈ O, and let T1 be some time when
x(t) equals x′. If the active agent at time T1 is a defector, the
state remains unchanged. However, in view of Lemma 2, the
state x(t) does not remain at x′ forever and has to visit the
other states in O. Therefore, a cooperator will become active
at or after T1. Let T2 be the first time this happens. Then,
nC(x(T2 + 1)) = a− 1⇒ x(T2 + 1) /∈ O.
which is a contradiction, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: We only show the result for
the max line at a. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the
contrary that the max line at a is a defective line uDk for some
type k. From the definition of fluctuation sets we know that
there exists a state y ∈ Ø with nC(y) = a + 1 such that the
max active-by-y line is a defective line. Consider the initial
condition x(0) = y. If yk ≥ 1, i.e., at least one type-k agent
is a cooperator at y, then under the activation sequence where
a type-k cooperator is active at t = 0 and another cooperator
is active at t = 1, we obtain nC(1) = a and uDk is active by
x(1), resulting in nC(2) = a− 1. Hence, x(2) 6∈ Ø, which is
a contradiction. Note that such an activation sequence exists
since nC(y) = a+ 1 ≥ 2. If yk = 0, i.e., all type-k agents are
defectors at y, then uDk is already active by y. Thus, under the
activation sequence where two different cooperators are active
at t = 0 and t = 1, we obtain nC(1) = a and nC(2) = a− 1,
resulting in, again, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let Ø be a fluctuation set with the
corresponding interval I. Because of the minimality of Ø,
there exists a state y ∈ Ø with nC(y) = a+1 such that among
the lines active-by-y, the max at a+1 is defective. Consider the
initial state x(0) = y. Under the activation sequence where a
cooperator is active at time t = 0, we obtain the state x(1) with
nC(x(1)) = a. On the other hand, in view of Lemma 3, the
max line among those active by x(1) is cooperative. Hence, the
cooperative line at a intersects with the defective line at a+ 1
in the interval (a, a+ 1), resulting in a non-integer potentially
attracting intersection point, which is a fluctuation point since
y ∈ X+(x(1)). Similarly, there must exist a fluctuation point
in (b− 1, b), completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5: (Necessity) Since [a, a+ 1] contains
a fluctuation point, there exists a state y ∈ X with nC(y) = a
such that the max active-by-y line at a is cooperative, and
there exists a state y+ ∈ X+1(y) such that the max active-
by-y+ line at a + 1 is defective. It is impossible to have all
defectors at y being in S since then for any state y+ ∈ X+1(y),
one of the cooperative lines above uDs at a + 1 is active by
y+, making the max active-by-y+ line cooperative. Thus, at
least one defector at y, say agent d, is not in S. Now, first,
we prove by contradiction the existence of a state z ∈ X with
nC(z) = a+ 1 such that the max active-by-z line at a+ 1 is
the defective line uDs . Assume on the contrary that there is no
such state. Since the interval [a, a + 1] contains a fluctuation
point, there exists v ∈ X with nC(v) = a + 1 such that the
max active-by-v line is a defective line other than uDs . Since
the max defective line at a + 1 is uDs , and u
D
s is inactive by
v, there exists a type-s cooperator at the state v, denoted by
s1. Then starting from the initial state x(0) = v and under
the activation sub-sequence (s1, d), we have x(2) = v with
nC(v) = a + 1 such that the max active-by-v line is uDs ,
resulting in a contradiction.
Next, we complete the proof by contradiction. Assume on
the contrary that |R \ S| ≥ a. We construct an activation
sequence that drives the initial state x(0) = z, to a state with
the number of cooperators less than a, i.e., nC < a. Let C =
{c1, c2, . . . , ckc} denote all of the cooperators at z who are not
in R and D = {d1, d2, . . . , dkd} denote all of the defectors at
z who are in R \ S. Since no cooperative line that is above
uDs at a + 1 is active by z, there is no cooperator at z that
belongs to S. Thus, there are a+1−kc number of cooperators
in R \ S . Then the number of defectors in R \ S is
kd = |R \ S| − (a+ 1− kc).
Since |R \ S| ≥ a, we have kc ≤ kd + 1. So the following
activation sequence is well defined:
(c1, d1, c2, d2, . . . , dkc , ckc).
Consider the initial state x(0) = z. Upon the activation of
each agent ci, i = 1, . . . , kc, in this sequence, she switches to
defection as the max active-by-z line is uDs at a+ 1, it never
becomes inactive, and no cooperation line above uDs at a+ 1
becomes active by any of the di, i = 1, . . . , kc, since they are
not in S. By the end of this sequence, i.e., when ckc switches
to defection, we have nC(x(T + 1)) = a, were T = 2kc.
Moreover, there is no cooperator left at x(T +1) that is not in
R, and hence, uDr becomes the max active-by-x(T + 1) line.
Hence, if any cooperator becomes active at T + 1, we obtain
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nC(x(T + 2)) < a, which is a contradiction, completing the
proof of this case.
(Sufficiency) We prove by contradiction. Assume on the
contrary that there exists an initial state x(0) with nC(x(0)) =
a+1, such that under some activation sequence, nC(x(1)) = a
and nC(x(2)) = a− 1. This implies that the max active lines
by x(0) and x(1) are both defective at nC = a+1 and nC = a.
Hence, all agents in S are defectors at x(0), and remain so at
x(1). So in view of |R \S| < a, there is a cooperator at x(1)
who is not in R. Thus, there is a cooperative line above uDr at
a being active by x(1), implying that the max active-by-x(1)
line at a cooperative. This contradicts our earlier conclusion,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof is similar to that of lemma
5. We only prove that [a, a + 1] is a left wall. Let Ø be the
corresponding fluctuation set of I. The minimality of Ø yields
the existence of z ∈ Ø with nC(z) = a+ 1 such that the max
active-by-z line at a + 1 is defective. Moreover, [a, a + 1]
contains a fluctuation point thanks to Lemma 4. So the rest of
the proof can be done similarly to that of Lemma 5.
Proof of Corollary 1: From Theorem 2 we know that
[a, a + 1] is a left wall and [b − 1, b] is a right wall. By the
definition of walls, we know that for any initial condition x(0)
with nC(x(0)) ∈ [a+1, b−1], we have nC(x(t)) ∈ I ∀t > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2: If there is no interval I =
[a, b], a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that [a, a + 1] is a left and
[b−1, b] is a right wall, then according to Theorem 2 there is no
fluctuation interval, which by definition implies that there is no
fluctuation set, i.e. non-singleton minimal positively invariant
set. From Proposition 2 we know that this implies that x(t)
reaches an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: Since [a, a+ 1] and [b−1, b] are
left and right walls, in view of Corollary 1, for any x(0) ∈ Q in
(4), we have x(t) ∈ Q ∀t ≥ 0. On the other hand, according to
Lemma 1, x(t) will reach a non-singleton minimal positively
invariant set Ø since I does not contain any equilibrium. Let
I ′ be the fluctuation interval corresponding to Ø. It must hold
that I ′ 6⊂ I as, otherwise, I contains another wall due to
Theorem 2. Moreover, I ′ ∩ ([0, n] − I) = ∅ because of the
two walls. Hence, I ′ = I, implying that I is the corresponding
interval of a fluctuation set, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3: By Lemma 5 and 6, condtion
2) implies that [bnC(pij)c, bnC(pij)c + 1] is a left wall and
[dnC(plk)e−1, dnC(plk)e] is a right wall. By condition 1) the
definition of walls, we know that there exists a positively in-
variant set Ø such that I = [minx∈O nC(x),maxx∈O nC(x)].
From condtion 3), we know that the set Ø is minimal. From
condtion 4), we know that the set is non-single. Therefore,
the set Ø is a fluctuation set and the interval I is a fluctuation
interval.
Proof of Proposition 5: The sufficient result is trivial,
so we proceed to the necessity. If s is stable, then for the
initial condition x(0) = (x1 − 1) ∈ B2(s), it must hold that
x(t) ∈ B2(s) = {(x1 − 1), (x1), (x1 + 1)} ∀t ≥ 0. Hence,
x(1) ∈ {(x1 − 1), (x1)}, implying that the max active-by-
x(0) line at x1 cannot be defective, yielding uC1 (x1 − 1) ≥
uD1 (x1 − 1). If s is asymptotically stable, then the equality
case may no longer hold since it results in (x1 − 1) being
an equilibrium, which prevents the solution trajectory from
returning to s. The case with x(0) = (x1 + 1) is similar and
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6: We only show the proof for
s = (0, . . . , 0).
(Necessity) If s = (0, . . . , 0) is unstable, then there exists
a ball B(s) such that for any Bδ(s) there exists an initial
condition x(0) ∈ Bδ(s), such that x(t) /∈ B(s) for some t ≥ 1
and under some activation sequence. Since B2(s) ⊆ B(s) and
δ ≥ 2, this implies the existence of an x(0) ∈ B2(s), such
that x(t) /∈ B2(s) for some t ≥ 1 and under some activation
sequence. Thus, for some x ∈ X with nC(x) = 1, the max
active-by-x line at nC = 1 is a cooperative line of, say, type
i. Hence, x = (0, . . . , 0, xi = 1, 0, . . . , 0), and uCi (1) must be
higher than all active defective lines at nC = 1, which are all
types j 6= i, as well as type i if ni > 1. This completes the
proof.
(Sufficiency) If there exists a type-i agent with ni > 1
such that uCi (1) > u
D
j (1) for every type-j agent, then for
x(0) = (0, . . . , xi = 1, . . . , 0), the max active line at nC = 1
is cooperative. Hence, upon the activation of a defector at time
t = 0, x(1) /∈ B2(s), implying the instability of s. The proof
is similar for ni = 1.
Proof of Theorem 5: First, we prove the stability result.
(Necessity) We prove by contradiction. Assume on the con-
trary that there exists a non-equilibrium state y ∈ X with
||x∗ − y|| = 1. Without loss of generality, let nC(y) =
nC(x∗) + 1 with yi = x∗i + 1 for some agent type i. If the
max active-by-y line is a cooperative line of type k, then for
x(0) = y ∈ B2(x∗), we have x(1) /∈ B2(x∗) if a defector
becomes active at time t = 0, which is a contradiction. Note
that a defector exists at y since, otherwise, y is an equilibrium.
If the max active-by-y line is a defective line of type k, but
there exists an agent type j 6= i such that yj > 0, then for
x(0) = y ∈ B2(x∗), we have x(1) /∈ B2(x∗) if a cooperating
agent of type-j becomes active at time t = 0, which leads
to a contradiction. So yj = 0 ∀j 6= i. However, in view of
‖y−x∗‖ = 1, this implies xj = 0 ∀j 6= i. Now the same must
hold for any other state y ∈ X satisfying ||x∗ − y|| = 1, but
with yp = x∗p + 1 for some type p 6= i. Hence, xj = 0 ∀j 6= p
as well. Therefore, xj = 0 ∀j, resulting in x = (0, . . . , 0),
which is impossible.
(Sufficiency) The result simply follows from the fact that
starting from an initial condition with distance 1 from x∗, the
solution trajectory remains there forever. This also proves the
asymptotic stability part.
Proof of Proposition 7: There is no defective line above
uCi at any n
C ∈ [a, nC(pij)] as there is no intersection point at
any nC ∈ (a, nC(pij)). Hence, for x(0) ∈ Q1, since xi(0) ≥
1, the max active-by-x(t) line is cooperative at all nC(x(t)) ∈
[a, nC(pij)], which drives nC(x(t)) to the fluctuation interval
I. The proof is similar for x(0) ∈ Q2.
Proof of Lemma 7: It suffices to show that for any poten-
tially attracting intersection point pij , i 6= j. Assume on the
contrary that there exists a potentially attracting intersection
point pii that is intersected by uCi and u
D
i for some agent
type i. From (2), the slope of uCi is ai = Ri − Si and the
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slope of uDi is ci = Ti −Pi. Hence, ai > ci according to (5).
Therefore,
ain
C(pii) + bi = cin
C(pii) + di
⇒ ai(nC(pii)− 1) + bi < ci(nC(pii)− 1) + di,
which contradicts the definition of potentially attracting inter-
section points.
Proof of Proposition 8: Thanks to Corollary 2, it suffices
to show that there is no fluctuation interval in the population
in the view of 2. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the
contrary that there is a fluctuation interval I = [a, b], a, b ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1} such that [a, a+ 1] is a left and [b− 1, b] is a
right wall. Thus, from Lemmas 5 and 6, we have |R \S| < a
at [a, a+1], and |K\L| < n− b at [b−1, b]. Let V denote the
set of agents that are not in R \ S at [a, a+ 1], which is the
set of agents whose cooperative lines are above uDr at a and
agents whose cooperative lines are below uDr at a but above
uDs at a + 1. Let W denote the set of agents that are not in
K \L at [b− 1, b], which is the set of agents whose defective
lines are above uCk at b and agents whose defective lines are
below uCk at b but above u
C
l at b− 1. Then we have
|V|+ |W| = (n− |R \ S|) + (n− |K \ L|)
> n− a+ n− (n− b) = n+ (b− a).
Moreover, the cooperative lines of the agents in V must be
below or equal to uCl at b− 1 and uCk at b since uCl and uCk
are the max cooperative lines at b− 1 and b respectively. For
the same reason, the defective lines of the agents in W must
be below or equal to uDr at a and u
D
s at a+1. In other words,
we have
uCi (a) > u
D
j (a) or u
C
i (a+ 1) > u
D
j (a+ 1) ∀i ∈ V,∀j ∈ W
uCi (b− 1) < uDj (b− 1) or uCi (b) < uDj (b) ∀i ∈ V,∀j ∈ W.
This implies that the cooperative lines of the agents in V and
defective lines of the agents in W must intersect, resulting
in potentially attracting intersection points. Thus, according
to Lemma 7, we know that one agent cannot be in both V
and W . In other words, we have V ∩W = ∅. This results in
|V|+ |W| ≤ n, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 8: According to (2) and (6),
uCi − uDi = (Ri − Ti)nC + (Si − Pi)(n− nC) < 0,
implying that uDi (n
C) > uCi (n
C) ∀nC ∈ {0, . . . , n}. This
leads to the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9: We prove by contradiction.
Assume on the contrary that the solution trajectory never
reaches an equilibrium. Hence, in view of Lemma 2, it reaches
a fluctuation set Ø at some time and remains there afterwards.
Let uDk , k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, denote the max defective line in
Lemma 8. Due to Lemma 4, there are fluctuation points at
the corresponding left and right walls of Ø, and the solution
trajectory will, hence, fluctuate at these walls. Because of the
randomness of the activation sequence, a type-k cooperator
will become active during one of these fluctuations and switch
to defection, making uDk active. Being the max line at every
nC , the line will never become inactive afterwards, driving the
solution trajectory to the extreme equilibrium at nC = 0. This
is a contradiction, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6: The proof is similar to that of
Proposition 8.
Proof of Lemma 10: For any type-i agent, we have
uCi (0) = Sin > u
D
i (0) = Pin and u
C
i (n) = Ri < u
D
i (n) =
Ti. This leads to the proof.
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